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CARTEL STABILITY UNDER QUALITY DIFFERENTIATION
IWAN BOS AND MARCO A. MARINI
Abstract. This note considers cartel stability when the cartelized products are vertically
differentiated. If market shares are maintained at pre-collusive levels, then the firm with
the lowest competitive price-cost margin has the strongest incentive to deviate from the
collusive agreement. The lowest-quality supplier has the tightest incentive constraint when
the difference in unit production costs is sufficiently small.
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1. Introduction
In this note, we examine cartel stability when the cartelized products are vertically dif-
ferentiated. Goods or services are differentiated vertically when there is consensus among
consumers about how to rank them quality-wise; comparing products A and B, all agree A
to have a higher (perceived) value than B or vice versa. There might, however, still be a
demand for lower-quality goods when buyers face budget constraints or differ in their will-
ingness to pay for quality. This creates an incentive for suppliers to compete through offering
different price-quality combinations.
One implication of this price-quality dispersion is that firms that consider colluding typ-
ically face heterogeneous incentive constraints. The fact that firms are induced to charge
different prices, for example, affects both collusive and noncollusive profits. From a supply-
side perspective, there commonly exists a positive relationship between the quality of a good
and its production costs. This, too, impacts both sides of the constraint. It is therefore a
priori unclear how quality differentiation impacts the sustainability of collusion.
The scarce literature on this topic provides mixed results and, moreover, does not con-
sider the potential impact of cost heterogeneity.1 Assuming identical costs, Ha¨ckner (1994)
and Symeonidis (1999) both analyze an infinitely repeated vertically differentiated duopoly
game.2 Ha¨ckner (1994) studies a variation of the setting in Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979)
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and Shaked and Sutton (1982) and finds that it is the high-quality supplier who has the
strongest incentive to deviate. By contrast, Symeonidis (1999) considers a representative
consumer model with horizontal and vertical product differentiation and establishes that it
is the low-quality seller who is most eager to leave the cartel.
In the following, we analyze an n-firm infinitely repeated game version of the classic vertical
differentiation model of Mussa and Rosen (1978) where production costs are assumed to be
increasing in quality.3 Under the assumption that colluding firms maintain their pre-collusive
market shares, we find that it is the competitive mark-up rather than the quality of the
product that drives the incentive to deviate. Specifically, it is the supplier with the lowest
noncooperative price-cost margin who has the strongest incentive to chisel on the cartel.
Moreover, our analysis confirms the above-mentioned conclusion by Symeonidis (1999) when
the difference in unit costs is sufficiently small.
The next section presents the model. Section 3 contains the main finding. Section 4
concludes.
2. Model
There is a given set of suppliers, denoted N = {1, . . . , n}, who repeatedly interact over
an infinite, discrete time horizon. In every period t ∈ N, they simultaneously make price
decisions with the aim to maximize the expected discounted sum of their profit stream.
Firms face a common discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1) and all prices set up until t− 1 are assumed
public knowledge.
Each firm i ∈ N sells a single variant of the product with quality vi. We assume ∞ >
vn > vn−1 > ... > v1 > 0 and refer to firm n as the top firm, firm 1 as the bottom firm
and all others as intermediate firms. Unit production costs of firm i ∈ N are given by the
constant ci and we suppose these costs to be positive and (weakly) increasing in quality, i.e.,
cn ≥ cn−1 ≥ . . . ≥ c1 > 0.
Consumers have a valuation for the various product types of θ, which is uniformly dis-
tributed on [θ, θ] ⊂ R++ with mass normalized to one. A higher θ corresponds to a higher
gross utility when consuming variant vi. Buyers purchase no more than one item so that
someone ‘located’ at θ obtains the following utility
(2.1) U(θ) =
{
θvi − pi when buying from firm i
0 when not buying,
where pi ∈
[
0, θvn
]
is the price set by firm i.4 Using (2.1), it can be easily verified that a
consumer at θi ∈ [θ, θ] is indifferent between buying from, say, firm i+ 1 and firm i when
(2.2) θi(pi, pi+1) =
pi+1 − pi
vi+1 − vi
,
for every i = 1, 2, ..., n − 1. In the ensuing analysis, we further assume that the market is
and remains covered (i.e., all consumers buy a product).5
3Like the model in Ha¨ckner (1994), this is a model with heterogeneous customers. Apart from the number
of firms and cost heterogeneity, it differs in terms of consumers’ utility specification.
4Note that none of the buyers would buy at prices in excess of θvn.
5This is a common assumption in contributions that employ this type of spatial setting. See, for example,
Tirole (1988, pp.296-298) and Ecchia and Lambertini (1997). We discuss some implications of this assumption
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Current profit of the bottom firm (i = 1) is therefore given by
(2.3) pi1 (p1, p2) = (p1 − c1) · (θ1 − θ) ,
where θ1 = θ1(p1, p2) is as specified by (2.2). For each intermediate firm (i = 2, 3, ..., n− 1)
profit is
(2.4) pii (pi−1, pi, pi+1) = (pi − ci) · (θi − θi−1) ,
and for the top firm (i = n) it is
(2.5) pin (pn−1, pn) = (pn − cn) ·
(
θ − θn−1
)
.
Before analyzing the infinitely repeated version of the above game, let us first consider
the one-shot case in more detail. In this setting, each firm simultaneously picks a price to
maximize its profit as specified in (2.3)-(2.5). Following the first-order conditions, this yields
three types of best-response functions:
(2.6) p̂1(p2) =
1
2
(p2 + c1 − θ(v2 − v1))
for the bottom firm (i = 1). For each intermediate firm (i = 2, 3, ..., n− 1), the best-reply is
given by
(2.7) p̂i(pi−1, pi+1) =
1
2
pi−1(vi+1 − vi) + pi+1(vi − vi−1)
(vi+1 − vi−1)
+
1
2
ci.
The best-response function of the top firm (i = n) is
(2.8) p̂n(pn−1) =
1
2
(
pn−1 + cn + θ(vn − vn−1)
)
.
Since the action sets are compact and convex and the above best-reply functions are con-
tractions, there exists a unique static Nash equilibrium price vector p∗ for any finite number
of firms.6 Finally, we impose two more conditions to ensure that the equilibrium solution is
interior (i.e., all firms have a positive output at p∗) and that the market is indeed covered
at the single-shot Nash equilibrium:
(2.9) θ > θ∗n−1 > θ
∗
n−2 > . . . > θ
∗
i > ... > θ
∗
1 > θ >
p∗1
v1
> 0,
where θ∗i ≡ θi
(
p∗i , p
∗
i+1
)
and p∗i ≥ ci, for all i ∈ N .
at the end of Section 3 and consider the possibility of an uncovered collusive market in an online appendix
to this paper.
6See, for instance, Friedman (1991, p.84). A sufficient condition for the contraction property to hold is
(see, for example, Vives 2000, p.47):
∂2pii
∂ (pi)
2
+
∑
j 6=i
∣∣∣∣ ∂2pii∂pi∂pj
∣∣∣∣ < 0,
which, using (2.4) for all intermediate firms i = 2, ..., n− 1, becomes
vi−1 − vi+1
(vi+1 − vi) (vi − vi−1)
< 0,
which holds. The same applies for the top and the bottom firm.
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3. Sustainability of Collusion
Within the above framework, we now study the sustainability of collusion assuming a
standard grim-trigger punishment strategy. The incentive compatibility constraint (ICC) of
a firm i ∈ N is then given by:
(3.1) Ωi ≡ pi
c
i − (1− δ) · pi
d
i − δ · pi
∗
i ≥ 0,
where pici = pii
(
pci−1, p
c
i , p
c
i+1
)
is its collusive payoff, pidi = pii
(
pci−1, p
d
i , p
c
i+1
)
, with pdi =
p̂i(p
c
i−1, p
c
i+1), is its deviation payoff and pi
∗
i = pii
(
p∗i−1, p
∗
i , p
∗
i+1
)
is its Nash equilibrium payoff.
A cartel comprising the entire industry is thus sustainable only when Ωi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N .
In principle, this set-up allows for a plethora of sustainable collusive contracts. In the fol-
lowing, we limit ourselves to what is perhaps the simplest possible agreement. Specifically,
we consider the maximization of total cartel profits without side payments under the as-
sumption that firms maintain their market shares at pre-collusive levels. Such an agreement
is appealing for several reasons. First, it seems a natural focal point in the issue of how
to divide the market. Second, there have been quite a few cartels that employed such (or
similar) market-sharing scheme.7 Third, it is arguably one of the most subtle arrangements
in that firm behavior maintains a competitive appearance, thereby minimizing the possibility
of cartel detection.
Let us now address the question of what collusive price vector such an all-inclusive cartel
would pick. As an initial observation, notice that the fixed market share assumption implies
that the price ranking should stay the same (i.e., collusive prices are strictly increasing in
quality). Moreover, as market size is given, the lowest-valuation buyer should still be willing
to buy the product. This means that
θv1 − p
c
1 ≥ 0.
Next, note that the fixed market share rule in combination with the covered market
assumption implies that each ‘marginal consumer’s location’ remains unaffected. Specifically,
the consumer who was indifferent between firm 1 and 2 absent collusion has now the following
utility when buying from firm 1:
U(θ∗1) =
(
p∗2 − p
∗
1
v2 − v1
)
v1 − p
c
1,
which in turn determines the collusive price for the product of firm 2:(
p∗2 − p
∗
1
v2 − v1
)
v1 − p
c
1 =
(
p∗2 − p
∗
1
v2 − v1
)
v2 − p
c
2.
Rearranging gives,
pc2 = p
∗
2 + (p
c
1 − p
∗
1) .
A higher collusive price by firm 2 would mean that the customer on the boundary prefers firm
1, which contradicts market shares being fixed. Likewise, a lower price implies a decrease
in sales for firm 1 and therefore cannot occur either. The collusive prices for all other firms
7See, for example, Harrington (2006).
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can be determined in a similar fashion. In general, the collusive price of firm i ∈ N\{1} is
equal to its Nash price plus the price increase by the lowest-quality firm:
(3.2) pci = p
∗
i + (p
c
1 − p
∗
1) .
Both cartel profits and the incentive constraints are therefore effectively a function of pc1
alone.
Since prices are strategic complements, it is clear that the cartel would like to set pc1 = θv1.
The collusive contract with pc1 = θv1 might not be sustainable, however, because one or
more ICC’s may be binding. The next result shows that it is the supplier with the lowest
noncollusive profit margin who has the tightest incentive constraint.
Proposition 1. For any i, j ∈ N and j 6= i, if p∗i − ci > p
∗
j − cj, then Ωi > Ωj.
Proof. Consider the ICC of an intermediate firm i = 2, 3, ..., n− 1:
Ωi ≡ pi
c
i − (1− δ) · pi
d
i − δ · pi
∗
i ≥ 0⇔ δ ≥ δi ≡
pidi − pi
c
i
pidi − pi
∗
i
.
To evaluate the critical discount factor δi of every intermediate firm, let us focus on
pidi , pi
∗
i and pi
c
i in turn. Every firm’s i = 2, 3, ..., n − 1 deviating profit is given by pi
d
i =(
pdi − ci
) (
θdi − θ
d
i−1
)
, which, using best-replies (2.7), yields
pdi − ci =
pci−1(vi+1 − vi) + p
c
i+1(vi − vi−1)− (vi+1 − vi−1)ci
2(vi+1 − vi−1)
or
(3.3) 2(vi+1 − vi−1)
(
pdi − ci
)
= pci−1(vi+1 − vi) + p
c
i+1(vi − vi−1)− (vi+1 − vi−1)ci.
Moreover,
θdi − θ
d
i−1 =
(vi − vi−1) p
c
i+1 + (vi+1 − vi) p
c
i−1 − (vi+1 − vi−1) ci
2 (vi+1 − vi) (vi − vi−1)
,
from which
(3.4)
2 (vi+1 − vi) (vi − vi−1)
(
θdi − θ
d
i−1
)
= (vi − vi−1) p
c
i+1 + (vi+1 − vi) p
c
i−1 − (vi+1 − vi−1) ci.
Combining (3.3)-(3.4) yields
2(vi+1 − vi−1)
(
pdi − ci
)
= 2 (vi+1 − vi) (vi − vi−1)
(
θdi − θ
d
i−1
)
and therefore (
θdi − θ
d
i−1
)
=
(vi+1 − vi−1)
(vi+1 − vi) (vi − vi−1)
(
pdi − ci
)
.
Hence, deviating profits can be written as
(3.5) pidi =
(
pdi − ci
)2( (vi+1 − vi−1)
(vi+1 − vi) (vi − vi−1)
)
.
In a similar vein, intermediate firms’ Nash profit can be written as
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(3.6) pi∗i = (p
∗
i − ci)
2
(
(vi+1 − vi−1)
(vi+1 − vi) (vi − vi−1)
)
.
Following the covered market assumption, we know that
θci − θ
c
i−1 = θ
∗
i − θ
∗
i−1
and
pci = p
∗
i + p
c
1 − p
∗
1.
Hence, every intermediate firm’s collusive profit can be written as
(3.7) pici = (p
c
i − ci)
(
θci − θ
c
i−1
)
= (p∗i + p
c
1 − p
∗
1 − ci)
(
(vi+1 − vi−1)
(vi+1 − vi) (vi − vi−1)
(p∗i − ci)
)
.
Note further that
pdi =
(vi − vi−1) p
c
i+1 + (vi+1 − vi) p
c
i−1 + (vi+1 − vi−1) ci
2 (vi+1 − vi−1)
=
(vi − vi−1)
(
p∗i+1 + p
c
1 − p
∗
1
)
+ (vi+1 − vi)
(
p∗i−1 + p
c
1 − p
∗
1
)
+ (vi+1 − vi−1) ci
2 (vi+1 − vi−1)
= p∗i +
1
2
(pc1 − p
∗
1) .
Combining (3.5)-(3.7) yields
(3.8) pidi − pi
c
i =
(
(vi+1 − vi−1)
(vi+1 − vi) · (vi − vi−1)
)[
1
4
(pc1 − p
∗
1)
2
]
,
and
(3.9) pidi − pi
∗
i =
(
(vi+1 − vi−1)
(vi+1 − vi) · (vi − vi−1)
)
(pc1 − p
∗
1)
[
1
4
(pc1 − p
∗
1) + (p
∗
i − ci)
]
.
Thus, by (5.1) and (5.2), the critical discount factor of every intermediate firm i = 2, 3, ..., n−
1 is given by
δi ≡
pidi − pi
c
i
pidi − pi
∗
i
=
1
4
(pc1 − p
∗
1)
1
4
(pc1 − p
∗
1) + (p
∗
i − ci)
,
which is decreasing in the noncollusive price-cost margin.
Turning to the top-quality firm, by following the above steps, it can be verified that
pidn =
(
pdn − cn
)2
(vn − vn−1)
, pi∗n =
(p∗n − cn)
2
(vn − vn−1)
and
picn = (p
c
1 − p
∗
1 + p
∗
n − cn)
(
θ (vn − vn−1)−
(
p∗n − p
∗
n−1
)
vn − vn−1
)
,
yielding
δn ≡
pidn − pi
c
n
pidn − pi
∗
n
=
1
4
(pc1 − p
∗
1)
1
4
(pc1 − p
∗
1) + (p
∗
n − cn)
.
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Hence, it is the supplier with the smaller noncooperative price-cost margin (between firm
n and firm n− 1) who has the tighter incentive constraint.
Finally, in a similar fashion, it can be shown that
pid1 =
(
pd1 − c1
)2
(v2 − v1)
, pi∗1 =
(p∗1 − c1)
2
(v2 − v1)
and
pic1 = (p
c
1 − c1)
(
pc2 − p
c
1 − (v2 − v1) θ
v2 − v1
)
=
(pc1 − c1) (p
∗
1 − c1)
(v2 − v1)
,
yielding
δ1 ≡
pid1 − pi
c
1
pid1 − pi
∗
1
=
1
4
(pc1 − p
∗
1)
1
4
(pc1 − p
∗
1) + (p
∗
1 − c1)
.
Hence, p∗2 − c2 > p
∗
1 − c1 implies Ω2 > Ω1, whereas p
∗
1 − c1 > p
∗
2 − c2 implies Ω1 > Ω2. We
thus conclude that, if p∗i − ci > p
∗
j − cj , then Ωi > Ωj for all i, j ∈ N, j 6= i. 
The incentive to deviate from the collusive agreement is determined by the short-term
gain of defection
(
pidi − pi
c
i
)
and the severity of the resulting punishment (pidi −pi
∗
i = pi
d
i −pi
c
i +
pici − pi
∗
i ). The proof of Proposition 1 reveals that the ‘extra profit effect’ is the same across
firms and that the heterogeneity in incentive constraints is exclusively driven by differences
in the punishment impact (pici − pi
∗
i ). Specifically, there is a positive relation between a firm’s
market share and its noncollusive price-cost margin. Since market shares are fixed at pre-
collusive levels, members with a higher competitive mark-up are hit relatively harder by a
cartel breakdown and this creates a stronger incentive to abide by the agreement.
The next result follows immediately. In stating this result, let △cij = ci − cj for any firm
i, j ∈ N and j 6= i.
Corollary 1. For any firm i, j ∈ N and j 6= i, ∃µ ∈ R++ such that if △cij < µ and vi > vj,
then Ωi > Ωj.
Hence, if the difference in unit production costs is sufficiently small, then it is the lowest-
quality supplier who has the tightest incentive constraint. Our analysis thus confirms the
above-mentioned conclusion by Symeonidis (1999) in case quality heterogeneity is primarily
driven by (sunk) fixed costs rather than variable costs.8
Let us conclude this section with a remark on the covered market assumption. Note
that since each ICC is strictly concave in the own cartel price, a sufficient condition for the
cartel to keep market size constant is that at pc1 = θv1, Ωi ≤ 0 and
∂Ωi
∂pc
i
< 0 for all i ∈ N .
Endogenizing the size of the market would therefore not affect the above findings when the
discount factor is sufficiently low. If its members are patient enough, however, then the
cartel would like to uncover the market. This case is generally far less tractable analytically,
but we show in an online appendix that this paper’s results also hold when the number of
low-valuation buyers leaving the market is sufficiently small.
8This result can also be shown to hold in an n-firm variation of the model in Ha¨ckner (1994). The analysis
is available upon request.
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4. Conclusion
Many markets are characterized by some degree of quality differentiation with correspond-
ing firm heterogeneity in cost and demand. One implication of such differences is that collud-
ing firms typically face non-identical incentive constraints. Existing literature on this topic
focuses on demand differences, while ignoring the potential impact of cost heterogeneity.
In this note, we considered how cartel stability is affected when unit costs are increasing in
product quality. Under the assumption that colluding firms maintain their pre-collusive mar-
ket shares, we found that the incentive to deviate from the collusive agreement is monotonic
in the noncollusive price-cost margin. Specifically, the supplier with the lowest competitive
mark-up is ceteris paribus most inclined to leave the cartel. Moreover, it is the lowest-quality
seller who has the tightest incentive constraint when differences in unit costs are sufficiently
small.
5. Appendix 1: Uncovered Market Case
In the note we show that the incentive to deviate from a cartel agreement is monotonic in
the noncollusive price-cost margin and that the firm with the lowest profit margin has the
tightest incentive constraint (Proposition 1). This result is derived under the assumption of
a fixed market size. In this appendix, we consider the possibility that the cartel ‘uncovers the
market’ by setting collusive prices at a level where some of the lowest-valuation customers
prefer to no longer buy the product. In the following, we show that the result of Proposition
1 also holds when the number of buyers leaving the market is sufficiently small.
To begin, consider the incentive compatibility constraint (ICC) of an intermediate firm
i ∈ N :
Ωi ≡ (p
c
i − ci)
(
θci − θ
c
i−1
)
− (1− δ)
(
pdi − ci
) (
θdi − θ
d
i−1
)
− δ (p∗i − ci)
(
θ∗i − θ
∗
i−1
)
≥ 0.
As the cartel uses a fixed market share rule, it holds that:
θci − θ
c
i−1
θ −
pc
1
v1
=
θ∗i − θ
∗
i−1
θ − θ
.
The ICC can thus be written as:
Ωi ≡ (p
c
i − ci)
(
θ∗i − θ
∗
i−1
) (θ − pc1v1)(
θ − θ
) −(1− δ) (pdi − ci) (θdi − θdi−1)−δ (p∗i − ci) (θ∗i − θ∗i−1) ≥ 0,
which is equivalent to
δ ≥ δi ≡
pidi − pi
c
i
pidi − pi
∗
i
=
(
pdi − ci
) (
θdi − θ
d
i−1
)
− (pci − ci)
(
θ∗i − θ
∗
i−1
) (θ− pc1v1)
(θ−θ)(
pdi − ci
) (
θdi − θ
d
i−1
)
− (p∗i − ci)
(
θ∗i − θ
∗
i−1
) .
Let us now specify pidi , pi
∗
i and pi
c
i . Following the proof of Proposition 1, deviating and
Nash profits are respectively given by
pidi =
(
pdi − ci
)2( (vi+1 − vi−1)
(vi+1 − vi) (vi − vi−1)
)
,
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and
pi∗i = (p
∗
i − ci)
2
(
(vi+1 − vi−1)
(vi+1 − vi) (vi − vi−1)
)
.
As to collusive profits, note that uncovering the market in combination with the fixed market
share rule implies that the lowest quality firm has the smallest price increase and that the
price increase is rising in quality. In other words, cartel prices must be chosen such that
each marginal consumer’s location ‘shifts upwards’ in order to maintain market shares at
pre-collusive levels. Rather than adding pc1−p
∗
1 to its Nash price p
∗
i (as in the covered market
case), intermediate firm i should therefore raise its price by more. Let this additional amount
be indicated by xi > 0 so that its collusive price is given by p
c
i = p
∗
i + p
c
1− p
∗
1+ xi. Collusive
profits are then
pici = (p
c
i − ci)
(
θci − θ
c
i−1
)
= (p∗i + p
c
1 − p
∗
1 + xi − ci)
(
(vi+1 − vi−1) (p
∗
i − ci)
(vi+1 − vi) (vi − vi−1)
) (θ − pc1
v1
)
(
θ − θ
) .
Focusing on the numerator of the critical discount factor first, we have
pidi − pi
c
i =
(
pdi − ci
)2
(vi+1 − vi−1)
(vi+1 − vi) (vi − vi−1)
− (p∗i + p
c
1 − p
∗
1 + xi − ci)
(
(p∗i − ci) (vi+1 − vi−1)
(vi+1 − vi) (vi − vi−1)
) (θ − pc1
v1
)
(
θ − θ
)
=
(
(vi+1 − vi−1)
(vi+1 − vi) (vi − vi−1)
)(pdi − ci)2 − (p∗i + pc1 − p∗1 + xi − ci) (p∗i − ci)
(
θ −
pc1
v1
)
(
θ − θ
)
 .
In this case, the deviating price is given by
pdi =
(vi − vi−1) p
c
i+1 + (vi+1 − vi) p
c
i−1 + (vi+1 − vi−1) ci
2 (vi+1 − vi−1)
=
(vi − vi−1)
(
p∗i+1 + p
c
1 − p
∗
1 + xi+1
)
+ (vi+1 − vi)
(
p∗i−1 + p
c
1 − p
∗
1 + xi−1
)
+ (vi+1 − vi−1) ci
2 (vi+1 − vi−1)
= p∗i +
1
2
(pc1 − p
∗
1) +
(vi − vi−1) xi+1 + (vi+1 − vi) xi−1
2 (vi+1 − vi−1)
.
To facilitate the presentation of the analysis, let us denote
yi =
(vi − vi−1)xi+1 + (vi+1 − vi)xi−1
2 (vi+1 − vi−1)
and s =
θ −
pc
1
v1
θ − θ
.
Substituting in the above equation gives
pidi − pi
c
i =
(
(vi+1 − vi−1)
(vi+1 − vi) (vi − vi−1)
)[ (
p∗i +
1
2
(pc1 − p
∗
1) + yi − ci
)2
− (p∗i + p
c
1 − p
∗
1 + xi − ci) (p
∗
i − ci) s
]
=
(
(vi+1 − vi−1)
(vi+1 − vi) (vi − vi−1)
)[
1
4
(pc1 − p
∗
1)
2 + (1− s) (p∗i − ci) [(p
∗
i − ci) + (p
c
1 − p
∗
1) + xi]
+ (p∗i − ci) (2yi − xi) + yi ((p
c
1 − p
∗
1) + yi)
]
or
(5.1) pidi − pi
c
i =
(
(vi+1 − vi−1)
(vi+1 − vi) (vi − vi−1)
)[
1
4
(pc1 − p
∗
1)
2 + z
]
,
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where
z ≡ (1− s) (p∗i − ci) [(p
∗
i − ci) + (p
c
1 − p
∗
1) + xi] + (p
∗
i − ci) (2yi − xi) + yi ((p
c
1 − p
∗
1) + yi) .
Note that with a covered market it holds that s = 1, xi = 0 and yi = 0, in which case z = 0
and the numerator reduces to the corresponding value in the proof of Proposition 1. Turning
to the denominator of the critical discount factor, we have
pidi − pi
∗
i =
(
pdi − ci
)2 (vi+1 − vi−1)
(vi+1 − vi) (vi − vi−1)
− (p∗i − ci)
2 (vi+1 − vi−1)
(vi+1 − vi) (vi − vi−1)
=
(vi+1 − vi−1)
[(
pdi − ci
)2
− (p∗i − ci)
2
]
(vi+1 − vi) (vi − vi−1)
=
(vi+1 − vi−1)
[(
p∗i +
1
2
(pc1 − p
∗
1) + yi − ci
)2
− (p∗i − ci)
2
]
(vi+1 − vi) (vi − vi−1)
=
(vi+1 − vi−1)
[
1
4
(pc1 − p
∗
1)
2 + (p∗i − ci) (p
c
1 − p
∗
1 + 2yi) + yi ((p
c
1 − p
∗
1) + yi)
]
(vi+1 − vi) (vi − vi−1)
or
(5.2) pidi − pi
∗
i =
(vi+1 − vi−1)
[
1
4
(pc1 − p
∗
1)
2 + r
]
(vi+1 − vi) (vi − vi−1)
,
where
r ≡ (p∗i − ci) (p
c
1 − p
∗
1 + 2yi) + yi ((p
c
1 − p
∗
1) + yi) .
Note that in case of a covered market yi = 0 so that r = (p
c
1 − p
∗
1) (p
∗
i − ci) as in the proof
of Proposition 1. Combining both terms (5.1) and (5.2) gives the critical discount factor:
δ ≥ δi ≡
1
4
(pc1 − p
∗
1)
2 + (1− s) (p∗i − ci) [(p
∗
i − ci) + (p
c
1 − p
∗
1) + xi]
+ (p∗i − ci) (2yi − xi) + yi ((p
c
1 − p
∗
1) + yi)
1
4
(pc1 − p
∗
1)
2 + (p∗i − ci) (p
c
1 − p
∗
1 + 2yi) + yi · ((p
c
1 − p
∗
1) + yi)
.
As a final step, let us evaluate this critical discount factor with respect to the price-cost
margin (p∗i − ci). Taking the first-derivative with respect to the noncollusive profit margin
of firm i yields:
∂δi
∂ ((p∗i − ci))
=
{
1
4
(pc1 − p
∗
1)
2 + (p∗i − ci) (p
c
1 − p
∗
1 + 2yi)
+yi ((p
c
1 − p
∗
1) + yi)
}[
(1− s) [2 (p∗i − ci) + (p
c
1 − p
∗
1) + xi]
+ (2yi − xi)
]
(
1
4
(pc1 − p
∗
1)
2 + (p∗i − ci) (p
c
1 − p
∗
1 + 2yi) + yi ((p
c
1 − p
∗
1) + yi)
)2
−
{
1
4
(pc1 − p
∗
1)
2 + (1− s) (p∗i − ci) [(p
∗
i − ci) + (p
c
1 − p
∗
1) + xi]
+ (p∗i − ci) (2yi − xi) + yi ((p
c
1 − p
∗
1) + yi)
}
(pc1 − p
∗
1 + 2yi)(
1
4
(pc1 − p
∗
1)
2 + (p∗i − ci) (p
c
1 − p
∗
1 + 2yi) + yi ((p
c
1 − p
∗
1) + yi)
)2 ,
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which is negative when
(1− s) (p∗i − ci)
{
2yi ((p
c
1 − p
∗
1) + yi) + (p
∗
i − ci) (p
c
1 − p
∗
1 + 2yi) +
1
2
(pc1 − p
∗
1)
2
}
−s {(pc1 − p
∗
1) + xi}
[
yi ((p
c
1 − p
∗
1) + yi) +
1
4
(pc1 − p
∗
1)
2
]
< 0.
Note that this condition holds for s→ 1. In a similar fashion, this can be shown to be true
for the bottom and top quality firm cases. Thus, we conclude that the result of Proposition
1 also holds when the cartel uncovers the market and the fraction of buyers no longer buying
the product is sufficiently small.
6. Appendix 2: Example with Nonuniform Distribution
Let us present a simple two-firm example with a non-uniform distribution of θ. The results
of the paper are also shown to hold in this case. Though of course far from being a proof,
this suggests that our findings may apply for a wider class of customer distributions.
Consider the model of the paper, but with two firms and a simple ‘two-step uniform’
distribution function where a subset of consumers (of mass s) is uniformly distributed over
a given interval
[
θ, θ˜
]
, with θ˜ ∈
(
θ, θ
)
and another subset (of mass (1− s) 6= s) is uniformly
distributed over
(
θ˜, θ
]
(higher willingness to pay consumers). The density function takes
the form:
f(θ) =

s
(θ˜−θ)
for θ ∈
[
θ, θ˜
]
and
1−s
(θ−θ˜)
for θ ∈
(
θ˜, θ
]
.
In the following, suppose that θ1(p1, p2) =
p2−p1
v2−v1
≤ θ˜ so that the profit functions are given
by:
pi1 = (p1 − c1)
(
p2 − p1
v2 − v1
− θ
)
s
(θ˜ − θ)
, and
pi2 = (p2 − c2)
(
θ˜ −
p2 − p1
v2 − v1
)
s
(θ˜ − θ)
+ (p2 − c2)
(
θ − θ˜
) 1− s
(θ − θ˜)
= (p2 − c2)
(
θ˜ (v2 − v1) s− sp2 + sp1 + (v2 − v1) (θ˜ − θ) (1− s)
(v2 − v1) (θ˜ − θ)
)
.
The first-order conditions give the best response functions:
p̂1 =
1
2
(p2 − (v2 − v1) θ + c1)
p̂2 =
(v2 − v1)
(
θ˜ − θ(1− s)
)
+ sp1 + sc2
2s
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Combining gives the Nash prices and corresponding profits:
p∗1 =
(v2 − v1)
(
θ˜ − θ (1 + s)
)
+ 2sc1 + sc2
3s
p∗2 =
(v2 − v1)
(
2
(
θ˜ − θ
)
+ θs
)
+ 2sc2 + sc1
3s
pi∗1 =
(v2 − v1)
(
θ˜ − θ (1 + s)
)
− sc1 + sc2
3s
(v2 − v1)
(
θ˜ − θ (1 + s)
)
− sc1 + sc2
3 (v2 − v1) (θ˜ − θ)

=
(p∗1 − c1)
2
(v2 − v1)
s
(θ˜ − θ)
.
pi∗2 =
(v2 − v1)
(
2
(
θ˜ − θ
)
+ θs
)
− sc2 + sc1
3s
(v2 − v1)
[
2
(
θ˜ − θ
)
+ θs
]
− sc2 + sc1
3 (v2 − v1) (θ˜ − θ)

=
(p∗2 − c2)
2
(v2 − v1)
s
(θ˜ − θ)
.
Under collusion, prices and profits are respectively given by:
pc1
pc2 = p
∗
2 + (p
c
1 − p
∗
1) =
(v2 − v1)
(
θ˜ − θ + 2θs
)
+ sc2 − sc1 + 3sp
c
1
3s
and
pic1 = (p
c
1 − c1)
(
pc2 − p
c
1
v2 − v1
− θ
)
s
(θ˜ − θ)
= (pc1 − c1)
(
p∗2 − p
∗
1
v2 − v1
− θ
)
s
(θ˜ − θ)
= (pc1 − c1)
(v2 − v1)
(
θ˜ − θ (1 + s)
)
+ sc2 − sc1
3 (v2 − v1) (θ˜ − θ)
 = (pc1 − c1) (p∗1 − c1)
(v2 − v1)
s
(θ˜ − θ)
.
pic2 = (p
c
2 − c2)
(
θ˜ (v2 − v1) s− s (p
c
2 − p
c
1) + (v2 − v1) (θ˜ − θ) (1− s)
(v2 − v1) (θ˜ − θ)
)
= (pc2 − c2)
(
θ˜ (v2 − v1) s− s (p
∗
2 − p
∗
1) + (v2 − v1) (θ˜ − θ) (1− s)
(v2 − v1) (θ˜ − θ)
)
= (pc2 − c2)
3θ˜ (v2 − v1) s− (v2 − v1)
(
θ˜ − θ + 2θs
)
− sc2 + sc1 + 3 (v2 − v1) (θ˜ − θ) (1− s)
3 (v2 − v1) (θ˜ − θ)

= (pc2 − c2)
(v2 − v1)
[
2
(
θ˜ − θ
)
+ θs
]
− sc2 + sc1
3 (v2 − v1) (θ˜ − θ)
 = (pc2 − c2) (p∗2 − c2)
(v2 − v1)
s
(θ˜ − θ)
.
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Finally, deviating price and profits are:
pd1 =
1
2
(pc2 − (v2 − v1) θ + c1)
pd2 =
(v2 − v1)
(
θ˜ − θ(1− s)
)
+ spc1 + sc2
2s
and
pid1 =
(
pd1 − c1
)(pc2 − pd1
v2 − v1
− θ
)
s
(θ˜ − θ)
=
=
1
2
(pc2 − (v2 − v1) θ − c1)
(
pc2 − (v2 − v1) θ − c1
2 (v2 − v1)
)
s
(θ˜ − θ)
=
(
pd1 − c1
)2
(v2 − v1)
s
(θ˜ − θ)
,
and,
pid2 =
(
pd2 − c2
)( θ˜ (v2 − v1) s− s (pd2 − pc1)+ (v2 − v1) (θ˜ − θ) (1− s)
(v2 − v1) (θ˜ − θ)
)
=
(v2 − v1)
(
θ˜ − θ(1− s)
)
+ spc1 − sc2
2s
(v2 − v1)
[
θ˜ − θ (1− s)
]
+ spc1 − sc2
2 (v2 − v1) (θ˜ − θ)

=
(
pd2 − c2
)2
(v2 − v1)
s
(θ˜ − θ)
.
Combining to obtain the critical discount factor of each firm gives:
δ1 =
pid1 − pi
c
1
pid1 − pi
∗
1
=
(
pd1 − c1
)2
(v2 − v1)
s
(θ˜ − θ)
−
(pc1 − c1) (p
∗
1 − c1)
(v2 − v1)
s
(θ˜ − θ)(
pd1 − c1
)2
(v2 − v1)
s
(θ˜ − θ)
−
(p∗1 − c1)
2
(v2 − v1)
s
(θ˜ − θ)
=
(
pd1 − c1
)2
− (pc1 − c1) (p
∗
1 − c1)(
pd1 − c1
)2
− (p∗1 − c1)
2
=
1
4
(pc1 − p
∗
1)
2
(pc1 − p
∗
1)
(
1
4
(pc1 − p
∗
1) + (p
∗
1 − c1)
)
=
1
4
(pc1 − p
∗
1)
1
4
(pc1 − p
∗
1) + (p
∗
1 − c1)
.
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and
δ2 =
pid2 − pi
c
2
pid2 − pi
∗
2
=
(
pd2 − c2
)2
(v2 − v1)
s
(θ˜ − θ)
−
(pc2 − c2) (p
∗
2 − c2)
(v2 − v1)
s
(θ˜ − θ)(
pd2 − c2
)2
(v2 − v1)
s
(θ˜ − θ)
−
(p∗2 − c2)
2
(v2 − v1)
s
(θ˜ − θ)
=
(
pd2 − c2
)2
− (pc2 − c2) (p
∗
2 − c2)(
pd2 − c2
)2
− (p∗2 − c2)
2
=
1
4
(pc1 − p
∗
1)
2
(pc1 − p
∗
1)
(
1
4
(pc1 − p
∗
1) + (p
∗
2 − c2)
)
=
1
4
(pc1 − p
∗
1)
1
4
(pc1 − p
∗
1) + (p
∗
2 − c2)
.
7. Appendix 3: Comparisons with Other Models
Symeonidis (1999) analyzes a representative consumer model, which differs from ours in
many ways. Meaningful comparisons are therefore difficult to make. Ha¨ckner’s (1994) model
is also different, but in many ways comparable. Specifically, he is using a utility specification
of the form U (θ) = vi (θ − pi), whereas we follow Mussa and Rosen (1978) which uses
U (θ) = viθ − pi. To address this issue, we have tried to clarify the differences between the
different settings in the introduction. Moreover, we have performed the same analysis in
Ha¨ckner’s (1994) setting. This analysis is presented below, but let us first summarize the
main conclusion. The main finding of Proposition 1 may not generally hold in Ha¨ckner’s
(1994) model. In particular, conclusions may be different when the highest quality firms
have the lowest profit margins and vice versa. Yet, the results of Proposition 1 do hold
when the noncollusive profit margin is increasing in quality. Moreover, if differences in unit
costs are sufficiently small, then it is indeed the lowest-quality seller who is most inclined to
deviate, all else unchanged. Consequently, the result of the Corollary also holds when taking
Ha¨ckner’s (1994) approach. We have added a footnote highlighting this point (footnote 8).
Consider an intermediate firm in an n-firm variant of Ha¨ckner’s (1994) model with cost
heterogeneity. A consumer located at θi is indifferent between buying from firm i and i+ 1
when:
θivi+1 − vi+1pi+1 = θivi − vipi or
θi =
vi+1pi+1 − vipi
vi+1 − vi
.
The profit function is then given by
pii = (pi − ci)
(
vi+1 (vi − vi−1) pi+1 + vi−1 (vi+1 − vi) pi−1 − vi (vi+1 − vi−1) pi
(vi+1 − vi) (vi − vi−1)
)
,
which yields the following best-response function:
p̂i (pi−1, pi+1) =
vi+1 (vi − vi−1) pi+1 + vi−1 (vi+1 − vi) pi−1 + vi (vi+1 − vi−1) ci
2vi (vi+1 − vi−1)
.
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Following the same steps in the proof of Proposition 1, this gives demand:
θ∗i − θ
∗
i−1 =
vi (vi+1 − vi−1)
(vi+1 − vi) (vi − vi−1)
(p∗i − ci)
and Nash profits
pi∗i = (p
∗
i − ci)
2
(
vi (vi+1 − vi−1)
(vi+1 − vi) (vi − vi−1)
)
.
In a similar fashion, it can be shown that:
pidi =
(
pdi − ci
)2( vi (vi+1 − vi−1)
(vi+1 − vi) (vi − vi−1)
)
.
As to collusive profits, we know that (due to the fixed market share rule):
θ∗i vi+1 − vi+1p
c
i+1 = θ
∗
i vi − vip
c
i or
pci+1 = p
∗
i+1 +
vi
vi+1
(pci − p
∗
i )
In general, the collusive price is then:
pci = p
∗
i +
v1
vi
(pc1 − p
∗
1) .
Following the covered market assumption, we know that θci − θ
c
i−1 = θ
∗
i − θ
∗
i−1 and therefore,
pici = (p
c
i − ci)
(
θci − θ
c
i−1
)
=
(
p∗i +
v1
vi
(pc1 − p
∗
1)− ci
)(
vi(vi+1 − vi−1)
(vi+1 − vi) (vi − vi−1)
(p∗i − ci)
)
.
Moreover,
pdi =
vi+1 (vi − vi−1) p
c
i+1 + vi−1 (vi+1 − vi) p
c
i−1 + vi (vi+1 − vi−1) ci
2vi (vi+1 − vi−1)
=
vi+1 (vi − vi−1)
(
p∗i+1 +
v1(pc1−p∗1)
vi+1
)
+ vi−1 (vi+1 − vi)
(
p∗i−1 +
v1(pc1−p∗1)
vi−1
)
+ vi (vi+1 − vi−1) ci
2vi (vi+1 − vi−1)
=
vi+1 (vi − vi−1) p
∗
i+1 + vi−1 (vi+1 − vi) p
∗
i−1 + (vi+1 − vi−1) v1 (p
c
1 − p
∗
1) + vi (vi+1 − vi−1) ci
2vi (vi+1 − vi−1)
= p∗i +
1
2
v1
vi
(pc1 − p
∗
1) .
Combining the above profit specifications gives
pidi − pi
c
i =
vi (vi+1 − vi−1)
(
pdi − ci
)2
(vi+1 − vi) (vi − vi−1)
−
vi(vi+1 − vi−1) (p
∗
i − ci)
(
p∗i +
v1
vi
(pc1 − p
∗
1)− ci
)
(vi+1 − vi) (vi − vi−1)
=
vi (vi+1 − vi−1)
[(
p∗i +
1
2
v1
vi
(pc1 − p
∗
1)− ci
)2
− (p∗i − ci)
2 − v1
vi
(pc1 − p
∗
1) (p
∗
i − ci)
]
(vi+1 − vi) (vi − vi−1)
=
vi (vi+1 − vi−1)
[
1
4
(
v1
vi
)2
(pc1 − p
∗
1)
2
]
(vi+1 − vi) (vi − vi−1)
.
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and
pidi − pi
∗
i =
vi (vi+1 − vi−1)
(
pdi − ci
)2
(vi+1 − vi) (vi − vi−1)
−
vi(vi+1 − vi−1) (p
∗
i − ci)
2
(vi+1 − vi) · (vi − vi−1)
=
vi(vi+1 − vi−1)
((
p∗i +
1
2
v1
vi
(pc1 − p
∗
1)− ci
)2
− (p∗i − ci)
2
)
(vi+1 − vi) · (vi − vi−1)
=
vi(vi+1 − vi−1)
(
1
4
(
v1
vi
)2
(pc1 − p
∗
1)
2 + v1
vi
(pc1 − p
∗
1) (p
∗
i − ci)
)
(vi+1 − vi) · (vi − vi−1)
=
vi(vi+1 − vi−1)
(
v1
vi
(pc1 − p
∗
1)
)(
1
4
(
v1
vi
)
(pc1 − p
∗
1) + (p
∗
i − ci)
)
(vi+1 − vi) · (vi − vi−1)
.
Thus, the critical discount factor of an intermediate firm i in Ha¨ckner’s (1994) setting with
cost heterogeneity and n firms is:
δ ≥ δi =
pidi − pi
c
i
pidi − pi
∗
i
=
(
vi(vi+1−vi−1)
(vi+1−vi)(vi−vi−1)
)[
1
4
(
v1
vi
)2
(pc1 − p
∗
1)
2
]
(
vi(vi+1−vi−1)
(vi+1−vi)·(vi−vi−1)
)(
v1
vi
(pc1 − p
∗
1)
)(
1
4
(
v1
vi
)
(pc1 − p
∗
1) + (p
∗
i − ci)
)
=
1
4
(
v1
vi
)
(pc1 − p
∗
1)
1
4
(
v1
vi
)
(pc1 − p
∗
1) + (p
∗
i − ci)
=
1
4
v1 (p
c
1 − p
∗
1)
1
4
v1 (p
c
1 − p
∗
1) + vi (p
∗
i − ci)
.
Results for the highest and lowest quality firm can be derived in a similar way (see the proof
of Proposition 1).
Recall that the corresponding critical discount factor in Proposition 1 is given by
δ ≥ δi =
pidi − pi
c
i
pidi − pi
∗
i
=
1
4
(pc1 − p
∗
1)
1
4
(pc1 − p
∗
1) + (p
∗
i − ci)
.
Observe that, compared to the result of Proposition 1, it is now possible that a firm with a
higher competitive profit margin is more eager to leave the cartel when it is of sufficiently
low quality (i.e., a high p∗i − ci may be more than neutralized by a low vi) and vice versa.
The result of Proposition 1 does apply, however, when the noncollusive price-cost margin
is increasing in quality. Moreover, and in contrast to Ha¨ckner, it is indeed the lowest-
quality supplier who has the tightest incentive constraint when differences in unit costs are
sufficiently small (in accordance with the result of the Corollary). As to the latter, note that
Ha¨ckner (1994) considers a duopoly without costs and does not impose a fixed market share
rule, which is an important driver of our finding.
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